Regulation of Concentration Through Merger Control: Germany\u27s Continuing Efforts by Stockmann, Kurt
Michigan Journal of International Law 
Volume 2 Issue 1 
1981 
Regulation of Concentration Through Merger Control: Germany's 
Continuing Efforts 
Kurt Stockmann 
International Section of the Bundeskartellamt of the Federal Republic of Germany 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Business Organizations Law Commons, 
Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Trade Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kurt Stockmann, Regulation of Concentration Through Merger Control: Germany's Continuing Efforts, 2 
MICH. J. INT'L L. 128 (1981). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol2/iss1/7 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of 
International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
Regulation of Concentration
Through Merger Control:
Germany's Continuing Efforts
KURT STOCKMANN
The Federal Republic of Germany's Law Against Restraints
on Competition (the ARC),' establishes an extensive regime for regulating
market-dominating enterprises. Therefore, large corporations, both national
and multinational, are the subject of particular scrutiny in the Federal Re-
public. Rather than identify and address all the provisions pertinent to corpo-
rate concentration (a task whose tedium would be matched only by its enor-
mity), this analysis will undertake three tasks: (1) briefly describe the gen-
eral scope of West German merger law, (2) discuss the application of the law
to cases of transnational concentration, and (3) explain the proposed Fourth
Amendment to the ARC as it affects merger control.
The German merger control law was introduced in 1973,2 sixteen years
after the basic antitrust statute-the ARC-had been enacted. At the outset,
it should be noted that corporate concentration itself is not prohibited; rather,
by framing the 1973 law in terms of "merger control," the German govern-
ment premised the regulatory policy on corporate activities that created con-
centration-that is, mergers, acquisitions, and other actions or corporate
arrangements.
3
The merger control amendments to the ARC provide, in general, for two
methods of enterprise concentration regulation-a notification procedure and
a control procedure.4 The notification procedure was formulated with the
intent that it be used as an instrument for collecting comprehensive data on
trends of corporate concentration. However, it is also used in conjunction
with the techniques for preventing concentration.
The participating corporate enterprises in either a proposed or consum-
This article is adapted from a presentation made by Mr. Stockmann at the Symposium
on Transnational Corporate Concentration held at the University of Michigan Law
School on November 9 and 10, 1979. Mr. Stockmann is chief, International Section of
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mated merger are obliged to notify the Federal Cartel Office (FCO) of the
merger if the participating parties meet certain market share or absolute size
criteria.' Under the "market share" criteria, all completed mergers must be
reported to the FCO if, within the relevant geographic region (that is, either
the national territory or a substantial part thereof, e.g., the Saarland), the
merger creates or augments a combined market share of 20 percent or more,
or if one of the participating enterprises already possesses a 20 percent share
in another market.6 Thus, the reporting obligation extends not only to hori-
zontal mergers, but to vertical and conglomerate mergers that involve a par-
ticipant with a significant market share (20 percent or more) in another
geographic or product market.7 Failure to meet the notification requirements
may lead to the imposition of fines.
8
As a rule, the notification of a merger is required only after consumma-
tion of the merger. There is an exception, however, for particularly large
mergers. Prior notification is required if the proposed merger involves at least
two enterprises recording individual sales of at least one billion DM in the
preceding fiscal year.
9
Each enterprise participating in the merger must file a report with the
FCO, specifying basic descriptive information such as the form of the
merger, as well as the name, location, and business activity of the participat-
ing enterprises. More complex information is also required, including market
share data and the basis for the market share computation, the number of
employees and sales, and any details of relationships with other enterprises
(for example, affiliation relationships, percentage holdings, and other forms
of corporate control).1°
The second step to the regulatory scheme-the merger control proce-
dure-applies if a merger is likely to create or strengthen a market-
dominating position." If a merger is likely to create or strengthen a market-
dominating position, the FCO has the authority to prohibit the merger.' 2 If
the merger has been consummated prior to the FCO's determination, it may
be dissolved.' 3 There is an important threshold level-500 million DM of
combined sales between the merging enterprises-which, if not met, pre-
cludes the application of merger control.14
Moreover, the threshold of market dominance is very high, definitely
higher than the threshold the U.S. antitrust law provides in Section 7 of the
Clayton Act under the "lessening of competition" test.' 5 The concept of a
market-dominating position is defined in Section 22 of the ARC. Under this
definition, an enterprise is market-dominating if it has either no competitor
or is not exposed to substantial competition or occupies a paramount market
position in relation to its competitors. As a matter of practice, the most impor-
tant criterion for establishing market domination is market share.'6 The law
creates a rebuttable presumption of market domination if an enterprise has a
market share of one-third or more and annual sales of at least 250 million
DM; or in the case of oligopoly, if three or less enterprises have a combined
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market share of one-half or more, or five or less enterprises have combined
market shares of two-thirds or more, and each of the enterprises has annual
sales of at least 100 million DM. 7
However, the concept of paramount market position-encompassing a
rather fluid or broad spectrum of competitive circumstances-is of particular
importance in coping with vertically integrated enterprises and conglomer-
ates where strict reliance on market share criteria is of limited value for
determining market domination.18 Factors for determining paramount mar-
ket position include market share, financial strength, access to supply or
sales markets, links with other enterprises and the existence of legal or
factual barriers to market entry.'
9
Turning the focus to the interests of the participating parties to a
merger, the ARC provides several avenues for obtaining merger approval. If
the FCO finds that the merger creates or strengthens a market-dominating
position, the merger may still be approved if the participating parties can
show: (1) that the merger will improve competitive conditions, and (2) that
these improvements outweigh the detrimental effects of the market
domination.
20
In the event that the FCO has prohibited a merger, the participating
enterprises may apply for authorization of the merger to the federal minister
of economics. The minister will authorize the merger if the restraint on
competition is balanced by the overall economic advantages of the merger, or
if the merger is justified by an overriding public interest. In authorizing the
merger, the minister can impose restrictions and requirements in order to
preserve overall economic advantages or to protect the public interest. How-
ever, such conditions may not subject the participating enterprises to a con-
tinuous control of conduct.
2
'
An appeal against the Federal Cartel Office's prohibition may also be
taken to the Berlin Court of Appeals, and may be taken at the same time the
enterprises apply for authorization from the federal minister of economics.
The minister's decision may also be appealed. The appeals may be based on
new facts and evidence, and the Federal Cartel Office's findings do not have
res judicata effect in the Berlin Court of Appeals. Points of law are subject to
further review on appeal by the Federal Supreme Court.
22
In applying this law to cases of transnational concentration, it should be
noted that the law does not distinguish between entirely domestic mergers
and mergers involving foreign firms or even mergers realized exclusively
between foreign firms. The jurisdictional test for the application of the law is
whether there are effects in the German territory.2 This is a very clear and
unlimited adoption of the so-called effects principle as opposed to the con-
duct principle, which requires that at least part of the conduct causing rele-
vant anticompetitive effects has taken place on the territory of the country
assuming jurisdiction.
The exact scope and content of the "effects" test is a matter not yet
resolved. In a number of earlier decisions, the Federal Supreme Court held
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that there was no general notion of effects for jurisdictional purposes; rather
the existence or absence of effects has to be judged in connection with the
rule of substantive law invoked in any particular case. Otherwise the ARC
provisions could be extended to a point which was not intended by the
legislature.24 For instance, if the legality of an export cartel is the question,
whether there are effects in the Federal Republic of Germany for purposes of
exerting jurisdiction has to be decided by interpreting the rule on export
cartels.' Consequently, the applicability of ARC's notification and prohibition
procedures depends on the interpretation of the substantive rule of law, i.e.,
ARC §§23 and 24, and not only on § 98(2)'s effects doctrine.
A recent Supreme Court decision examining the relationship between
the notification and control procedures may have potentially major ramifica-
tions for the application of the German merger control law to multinational
corporations operating both within and without German territory. The case
involved an acquisition completed in the United States of a New Jersey
corporation, Allied Chemical Corporation (ACC) by another New Jersey cor-
poration, Harmon Colors Corporation (HCC). HCC was wholly owned by
Rhinechem Corporation (New York), which was wholly owned by Bayer
International Finance N.V. (Dutch Antilles), which, in turn, was wholly
owned by the appellant Bayer AG, a German producer and distributor of
organic pigments. ACC also produced organic pigments and had developed a
great expertise in the field although without achieving a substantial share of
the market. Bayer AG and ACC together accounted for less than 4 percent of
the organic pigments market in Germany in the year prior to the acquisition
and slightly more than 4 percent in this year.
The FCO considered Bayer a party to this merger because its affiliate
HCC (twice removed) was dependent on it as defined in Section 17(2) of the
Joint Stock Companies Act. The FCO considered that Bayer AG was obliged
to notify it of the acquisition by Bayer's affiliate HCC, regardless of the fact
that the acquisition was completed abroad; it was sufficient that the German
market is affected.26
The appellant argued that the decisive criterion for requiring notification
of the merger under ARC Section 23(1) was whether a market dominating
position was likely to be created or strengthened, i.e., the criterion for merger
prohibition under ARC Section 24(1). In essence, the appellants asserted
that the need to comply with the ARC notification requirement was circum-
scribed by the jurisdictional elements for substantive merger control.
The FCO and the Berlin Court of Appeals had held that the notification
procedure played an independent role in merger control, apart from the
actual control provisions. The Supreme Court affirmed the government's
position and rejected appellant's argument. The Supreme Court held that
the notification of a merger can be required if it has a perceptible immedi-
ate effect on the conditions of competition in the relevant domestic market
regardless of whether these effects are substantial or whether the merger
will create or strengthen a position of market domination. 27 The Supreme
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Court found perceptible direct effects on the domestic market in spite of the
low market share of the parties because, as a result of the merger, ACC
ceased to be a competitor, and Bayer, in addition to increasing its sales
turnover, gained access to ACC's know-how from which Bayer hoped to
derive an improved competitive position in relation to the leading competi-
tor. That this could promote competition is irrelevant to the application of
the notification requirement; it is relevant only in the context of merger
prohibition.
28
The consequences of this dramatic decision could be quite sweeping if
the FCO enforces the notification requirement to the extent allowed by this
decision. However, with the exception of the Bayer case, the FCO typically
has been generous toward foreign participants in a merger, particularly with
regard to notification requirements.' The FCO's policy of limiting the en-
forcement of the notification requirement is supported by three considera-
tions. First, extraterritorial application of the ARC notification requirement
does not necessarily promote the procedure's fundamental purposes of pro-
viding information on concentration developments within Germany and es-
tablishing a trigger mechanism for prohibition control where warranted. As
the Supreme Court stated, the ARC's jurisdictional effects doctrine is not
aimed at the situation found abroad as such, but at the domestic effect
emerging as a result of a merger.3" Second, strict enforcement of the limits
allowed by the Supreme Court's decision would probably incur the interna-
tional criticism of the sort precipitated by the extraterritorial application of
U.S. antitrust law. Third, the restricted enforcement policy serves adminis-
trative convenience by alleviating the FCO's burden of data collection and
analysis which would be onerous if the Supreme Court's decision was applied
to its fullest extent.
The German legislature is also aware of this potential for broad enforce-
ment of the notification requirements. At present it is contemplating how far
considerations of international comity and the desire to avoid international
conflicts might warrant a retrenchment of the Supreme Court's sweeping
doctrine.
This leads to the final topic-the proposed Fourth Amendment to the
ARC which embraces a tougher approach to corporate concentration. This
draft amendment is now being discussed in the Bundestag's Committee on
Economic Policy.31 The government draft amendment, prepared by the Min-
istry for Economic Affairs, embraces two primary considerations: First, the
draft evinces a concern to make merger control more effective with respect to
vertical and conglomerate mergers. Although the experience since the enact-
ment of a merger control law is relatively satisfactory with regard to horizon-
tal concentrations, it is less satisfactory in regard to vertical and, in particu-
lar, conglomerate concentration. Historically, the entry of large enterprises
into markets characterized by small- and medium-sized enterprises has
tended to destroy or deteriorate the structure of these markets in a relatively
short time.
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The second consideration evinced in the amendment is a desire to close
loopholes used by large, market-dominating enterprises to circumvent gov-
ernment control; this evasion has, to a large extent, disadvantaged small
businesses. Large enterprises have abused the "affiliation clause" of ARC
§ 24(8)2 which exempts from control those mergers involving an enterprise
with sales of less than 50 million DM in the preceding year. Of 260 mergers
exempted in 1977, 230 fell within this affiliation clause. A great number of
these mergers involved large enterprises acquiring medium-sized companies
that fell below the 50. million DM threshold.32 Some enterprises also have
abused the intent of ARC § 23(2)2 (which defines mergers subject to control
as those involving acquisitions of 25 percent of voting capital) by acquiring
less than 25 percent voting capital yet simultaneously entering into arrange-
ments to gain excessive influence within the acquired enterprise. Thus, in
theory, these enterprises can escape merger control although, in fact, the
FCO has considered such acquisitions evasions of the merger definition if
the acquirer obtains the same legal position as if he had acquired a 25
percent share.33
To address these concerns, the Fourth Amendment proposes a number
of changes to the law with respect to market dominating enterprises. Among
the improvements proposed by the draft amendment are:
1. The inclusion of a provision to prevent the evasion of merger control by
particular forms of voting rights and shareholdings;
2. The adoption of additional presumptions of market domination allowing
better coverage of conglomerate and vertical mergers characterized by:
(a) the penetration of large enterprises into markets characterized by
small- and medium-sized firms, (b) the acquisition by a large firm of a
market-dominating but smaller firm, and (c) the merger of several very
large enterprises;
3. Better coverage of cases where oligopoly positions in important sectors of
the economy are further strengthened as a result of a merger;
4. Modification of the affiliation clause so as to subject most mergers of
large enterprises with small- and medium-sized firms to the merger
control requirement;
5. Filling the legislative gap in the supervision of abuses by market-
dominating enterprises by skimming off of pecuniary benefits earned
as a result of an abuse, and rendering abuse decisions more immedi-
ately enforceable.
3 4
The first of the above improvements expands the definition of merger
and widens the range of mergers subject to the notification requirements.
This would rectify the evasion from merger control by enterprises acquiring
effective control of another enterprise although less than the 25 percent of
the voting capital which defines merger under the current provision.3 5
The second recommended improvement creates presumptions with re-
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spect to market domination that can be more easily applied to vertical and
conglomerate mergers. The current presumptions of paramount market po-
sition have had practical effect in controlling primarily horizontal mergers.
In practice, presumptions of paramount market position have been based on
market shares and readily applied to horizontal mergers. In cases of vertical
and conglomerate mergers, a merger does not result in a homogenous,
aggregated market share since the relevant markets of each participating
enterprise remain separate and distinct. The market share analysis used in
horizontal concentration cases has not been easily adopted to these varie-
gated market concentrations, thereby impeding effective control.3 6 The
amendment provides three presumptions that ease the burden of proof in
the case of vertical and conglomerate mergers in establishing a paramount
market position. The first presumption of paramount market position applies
if an enterprise recording sales of at least two billion DM in the preceding
year merges with an enterprise doing business in a market in which at least
two-thirds of the market is attributable to small and medium enterprises.
The second presumption exists if an enterprise recording sales of at least
two billion DM in the preceding year merges with an enterprise recording
sales of at least 100 million DM and is in a market-dominating position in
one or more markets. The final presumption applies if the participating
enterprises recorded a combined turnover of at least ten billion DM in the
preceding year and at least two of the participating enterprises recorded
individual turnovers of at least one billion DM. These presumptions serve as
guidelines for enterprises contemplating a merger as well as standards for
the FCO's prohibition control. The presumptions reach only large enter-
prises, thus maintaining the primary aim of merger control-to prohibit only
mergers that threaten economic or social detriment.
37
The oligopoly amendments would change the law's current market ap-
proach-based on competition within the oligopoly group-to one which
considers whether a merger in an oligopolistic market creates or strengthens
a market-dominating position. The Fourth Amendment's new criterion is
restricted to merger control of important, closely knit oligopolies having a
paramount market position in relation to other competitors. The proposed
criterion should effectuate control of horizontal concentration trends in tight
oligopolistic markets.
38
The fourth recommended improvement addresses the affiliation clause
exemption of certain mergers from control. As noted earlier, an unintended
result of the affiliation clause (ARC § 24(8)2) has been that some large
enterprises have penetrated into markets with primarily small- and medium-
sized companies, thereby seriously deteriorating competitive structures. The
exemption's sales turnover limit of fifty million DM would be lowered to two
million DM, effectively eliminating this exemption. This amendment and the
new presumptions regarding paramount market position together might to
some extent improve conglomerate concentration control.
The fifth recommendation for improving ARC's control of market-
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dominating enterprises is aimed at quickening the abuse proceedings and
enlarging the sanctions against abuses by market-dominating enterprises.
The amendment provides for the immediate enforceability of abuse decisions
under § 22(5), eliminating the suspension effect the present law allows if an
appeal is lodged. The cartel authority would still be able to forego the imme-
diate enforcement of the decision, if the general public interest in early
discontinuation of the abuse is outweighed by the possible hardship for the
enterprise and the legal considerations associated with the particular circum-
stances. This fifth recommendation also provides for the payment of damages
for the period between issuance of the decision and conclusion of the final
appeal. It also provides for the skimming off of profits obtained by abuses
after the decision is issued that are not offset by the payment of damages.
39
No more hidden gains from antitrust violations will be theoretically possible.
In summary, the Federal Republic of Germany has tried to adopt a
flexible yet vigilant approach to regulating corporate concentration. Experi-
ence has shown that certain improvements would result in even more gov-
ernment involvement in, and control of, industrial structure and intercorpo-
rate activity in Germany. If the Fourth Amendment is enacted into law, the
legislature will have evidenced its willingness to increase government in-
volvement in structuring the Federal Republic's economy.4
°
As for the ARC and multinational corporations, the courts appear amen-
able to the extension of antitrust regulation, and specifically merger control,
to foreign corporations whose activities affect the German economy and in-
temal level of competition. To be certain, data on levels of transnational
corporate concentration and merger activity will be gathered through the
application of the merger notification requirement to foreign corporations.
Inasmuch as this data can be a valuable first step toward actual control, a
trend toward extraterritorial substantive regulation may develop with time.
Moreover, enactment of the Fourth Amendment would probably generate
additional momentum for increased extraterritorial scrutiny. However,
awareness of the U.S. experience in extraterritorial antitrust enforcement, as
well as the existent EEC antitrust regime that could be applied to transna-
tional corporate activity, warrants a cautious approach in this area.
NOTES
1. Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrdn- are deemed to be mergers within the
kungen (Act Against Restraints of meaning of the law. These include
Competition) of July 27, 1957, certain acquisitions, takeovers, cer-
BGBL. Tefl I, 1081 (1957). (ARC). tain contractual arrangements, ex-
2. Statute Amending the Act Against ecutive board appointments, and
Restraints on Competition of August "any other relationship between or
3, 1973, BGBL., Teil I, 917 (1973). among enterprises on the basis of
3. ARC § 23(2) enumerates several which one or several enterprises may
transactions and arrangements that exercise directly or indirectly a con-
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trolling influence over another enter-
prise." ARC § 23(2)5.
4. ARC §§ 23, 24, 24a.
5. ARC §§ 23(1), 24(a)(1).
6. ARC § 23(1)1.
7. See, A. RIESENKAMPFF, GESETZ
GEGEN WETTBEWERBS-
BESCHRANKUNGEN 85 (1977).
8. ARC § 39.
9. ARC § 24a(1).
10. ARC § 23(5).
11. ARC § 24(l).
12. ARC § 24(2).
13. ARC § 24(2).
14. ARC § 24(8)1.
15. A number of antitrust experts have
suggested that Germany move in the
direction of the lower United States
standard for restraints on competi-
tion in order to better effectuate con-
trol action.
16. Court rulings indicate that the rele-
vant product market includes all pro-
ducts so closely related by attribute,
function, or price that an educated
consumer regards these as interchan-
geably able to fulfill his need. See
WuW/E BGH 990(991) "Papier-
filtertiten II" E/BGH 1435 (1440)
"Vitamin B12" and WuW/E BGH 1445
(1449) "Valium." Foreign markets are
not considered by the Federal Cartel
Office. However, the minister of eco-
nomic affairs may do so under ARC §
24(3). He did, in fact authorize the ac-
quisition of one of the largest German-
owned oil companies, finding that the
merger did not threaten the market
economy since, on a worldwide scale,
the resulting German enterprise was
only medium in size. See WuW/E
BMW 147 "Veba/Gelsenberg."
17. ARC § 22(3)2.
18. However, it should be noted that in
administrative practice, the market
share criterion has been given deci-
sive weight in assessing these other
factors and whether they demon-
strate the existence of a market-
dominating position. See, Explana-
tory Memorandum to the Fourth Bill
to Amend the Act Against Restraints
of Competition of September 27,
1978, German Bundestag, 8th Term,
Document 8/2136, 27 (1978).
19. ARC § 22(1)2.
20. ARC § 24(1).
21. ARC § 24(3). The Federal Cartel Of-
fice cannot take such criteria into ac-
count; it assesses the merger exclu-
sively on the basis of its competitive
aspects.
22. ARC §§ 62-72; §§ 73-75.
23. ARC § 98(2) which states:
This law applies to all restraints
of competition which have effects
within the territory in which this
law applies, even if such effects are
caused by actions taken outside such
territory.
24. Judgment of 12 July 1973, Federal
Supreme Court, W. Germany, BGH
St 24, 208, 212; WuW/E BGH 1276
ff., 1279 (1973)--"01feldrhre."
25. Judgment of 12 July 1973, Federal
Supreme Court, WuW/E BGH 1276;
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY,
B5, WORLD LAW OF COMPETITION,
pt. 9, § 3.04(3)0) (re application of
the ARC to export cartels).
26. Judgment of 29 May 1979, Federal
Supreme Court, WuW/E BGH 1613
ff. (1979) "Organische Pigmente."
27. Id. at 1615. The court held that the
main rationale underlying Section 23
was not whether competition is or
would be actually impaired, but that
such an effect is likely due to the
size of the parties to the merger and
the competitive situation in the rele-
vant market, and that the Federal
Cartel Office must be allowed to ob-
serve economic concentration. The
court did not address the issue of
whether the ARC would apply to the
participation of a German enterprise
in a merger completed abroad when
the acquired foreign enterprise is not
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carrying on business within the Fed-
eral Republic. Also unanswered is
whether the ARC would apply to a
merger that involved a foreign corpo-
ration that was not engaged in any
type of commerce in the German
economy, but could still be con-
sidered a "potential entrant" for the
future. As applied by U.S. antitrust
authorities in international merger
cases, the potential entrant doctrine
has been severely criticized. See Fu-
gate, The Department of Justice's
Antitrust Guide for International
Operations, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 645,
661 (1977).
28. Id. at 1615.
29. The FCO has promulgated its own
standards for enforcing merger con-
trol. The detailed standards are diffi-
cult to understand for someone not
familiar with German antitrust law,
but it is safe to say that they are far
from the limits drawn by the Federal
Supreme Court. With regard to for-
eign mergers involving foreign par-
ticipants, the FCO scrutinizes only
mergers in which at least one Ger-
man company participates (thus dis-
regarding all mergers involving only
foreign participants). The standards
also significantly narrow the qualify-
ing range for notification by distin-
guishing between joint ventures and
other forms of concentration.
The FCO summarized its interpre-
tation of the ARC with regard to
mergers involving foreign corpora-
tions as follows:
A.
Effects on national territory are
therefore present in any case, if a
merger is realized within the area of
application of the GWB [the ARC]
(e.g. by the acquisition of the assets
or shares of a domestic enterprise,
establishment of a joint venture on
national territory--even if the ac-
quiring enterprises resp. [sic] the es-
tablishing enterprises are foreign en-
terprises). A merger realized abroad
is in regard to domestic subsidiaries
of the participants assumed to be a
merger realized on national territory
(Section 23(3) sentence 4 GWB).
B.
Mergers realized abroad have domes-
tic effects, if the merger influences
the structural conditions for domes-
tic competition and if at least one
domestic enterprise (also subsidiar-
ies or other connected enterprises) is
participating.
(1) If mergers are realized abroad
between only two directly participat-
ing enterprises (all categories of
mergers except joint ventures- e.g.
the acquisition of the assets or the
shares of a foreign enterprise by a
domestic enterprise-)
(a) domestic effects are present,
if both enterprises had been doing
business on the national territory
already before the merger, either
directly or via subsidiaries,
branch offices, or importers,
(b) domestic effects may be pre-
sent, if before the merger only one
enterprise was doing business on
national territory, but e.g.
(i) after the merger, supplies
of a foreign participant into
the national territory are
likely because of reasons of
production techniques (on
higher or lower production lev-
els) or because of relations to
the domestic participant in re-
gard to the range of products.
Whether such future supplies
are likely depends normally on
whether such or similar pro-
ducts are already traded be-
tween the countries involved
and such suppliers are not
hindered by technical or ad-
ministrative obstacles to trade;
(ii) by the merger the know-
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how of a domestic enterprise is
perceptibly increased resp.
[sic] commercial property
rights are transferred on this
enterprise.
(2) In cases of joint ventures es-
tablished abroad, domestic effects
depend primarily on the produc-
tive and geographic activity of
the joint venture. Whether there
are domestic effects in such cases
is to be assessed in regard to the
activity of the joint venture by
observing the principles described
under B.1. whereby the rela-
tionship in regard to production
techniques and/or product range
depends on the relationship be-
tween the joint venture and the
domestic participant.
A joint venture realized abroad may
also have domestic effects if
a) a foreign enterprise partici-
pating in the joint venture had
been doing business in the field of
business of the joint venture on
the national territory, or if it is
reasonably likely that it would
start doing business on the na-
tional territory without the
merger;
b) the domestic enterprise par-
ticipating in the joint venture ac-
quires production capacities to
such extent that its domestic
supply capacity is perceptibly
changed (substitution of domestic
production for exportation by
production export). Precondition
for such "perceptibility" is regu-
larly an already powerful market
position of the domestic
participant.
FEDERAL CARTEL OFFICE, ANNUAL
ACTIVITY REPORT FOR 1975, 45
(1975). For examples of merger
cases involving foreign participants
cf. FEDERAL CARTEL OFFICE,
ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORTS FOR
1973, 70 (1973) and for 1974, at 34.
30. "Organische Pigmente" WuW/E
BGH at 1615.
31. See annex 1 infra.
32. OECD, ANNUAL REPORTS ON COM-
PETITION POLICY IN OECD MEMBER
COUNTRIES, 1978/No. 2 at 36.
33. Id., 1977/No. 2 at 35 & 36.
34. Bill to Amend the Act Against Re-
straints of Competition of September
27, 1978, German Bundestag, 8th
Term, Document 8/2136, 1-2,
(1978). See annex I for translation of
relevant provisions.
35. Explanatory Memorandum, supra
note 18, at 30.
36. Id. at 26.
37. Id. at 25-27.
38. Id. at 25.
39. Id. at 29-32.
40. Indeed, as the Explanatory Memo-
randum states:
Business concentration can impair
competition in the same way as car-
telisation. It, too, can reduce the en-
couragement to efficient action and
to achieving technical progress. As
far as social policy is concerned, ex-
cessive concentration of economic
power destroys the foundation of an
order based on the principle of free-
dom. Political democracy and market
economy are unthinkable without
decentralised power.
See Explanatory Memorandum, su-
pra note 18, at 24.
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ANNEX 1: SELECTED EXCERPTS FROM THE "FOURTH BILL TO AMEND THE
ACT AGAINST RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION"
Article 1
The Act Against Restraints of Competition as published on 4 April 1974
(Legal Gazette I, p. 869), as amended by Article 59 of the Act of 14 Decem-
ber 1976 (Legal Gazette I, p. 3341) shall be amended as follows:
1. Section 12 shall be worded as follows:
"Section 12
(1) With regard to agreements and decisions of the nature described in
Sections 2, 3, 5 (1) and (4), 5a (1) and 5b (1), the cartel authority may
take the measures described in subsection (3),
1. insofar as the agreements and decisions or the manner of their im-
plementation constitute an abuse of the market position obtained as a
result of the exemption from Section 1, or
2. insofar as they violate the principles concerning trade in goods and
commercial services accepted by the Federal Republic of Germany in
international treaties.
(2) With regard to agreements and decisions of the nature described in
Section 6 (1), the cartel authority may take the measures described in
subsection (3), insofar as
1. the conditions mentioned in subsection (1) No. 2 are present, or
2. the implementation of the agreements or decisions substantially im-
pairs predominating foreign trade and payments interests of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany.
(3) The cartel authority may
1. direct the participating enterprises to discontinue the abuse objected
to,
2. direct the participating enterprises to amend the agreements or deci-
sions, or
3. declare the agreements and decisions to be of no effect."
2. Section 22 (3) sentence 2 shall be worded as follows:
"As regards the calculation of the market share and turnover, Section 23
(1) sentences 2 to 10 shall apply, as appropriate".
3. Section 23 shall be amended as follows:
(a) The following sentences 8, 9 and 10 shall be added to subsection (1):
"Where all or a substantial part of the assets of another enterprise are
acquired, the calculation of the market share, number of employees and
turnover of the selling enterprise shall take account of the sold assets only.
Sentence 8 shall apply, as appropriate, to the acquisition of shares, insofar
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as less than 25 per cent of the shares are retained by the seller and the
merger does not satisfy the conditions set out in subsection (2) No. 2
sentence 3 and No. 5. If a person or an association of persons not being an
enterprise is entitled to the majority interest in an enterprise, he, she or it
shall be deemed to be an enterprise."
(b) In subsection (2) No. 2, sentences 4 and 5 shall be substituted for
sentence 4:
"The acquisition of shares shall also be deemed a merger, insofar as the
acquirer obtains, by means of an agreement, bylaws, articles of associa-
tion, or a resolution, the legal position held in a joint stock company by a
shareholder owning more than 25 per cent of the voting capital. Shares in
an enterprise shall be equal to voting rights."
(c) Subsection (6) sentence 3 shall be worded as follows:
3. "Section 46 (2), (5) and (9) shall apply, as appropriate".
4. After Section 23 the following Section 23a shall be inserted:
"Section 23a
(1) Notwithstanding Section 22 (1) to (3), for merger control purposes a
paramount market position shall be presumed to be created or strength-
ened as a result of a merger, if
1. an enterprise which recorded a turnover of at least DM 2,000 million
in the last completed business year preceding the merger merges
with another enterprise which
(a) operates in a market in which small and medium-sized enter-
prises have a combined market share of at least two thirds and the
enterprises participating in the merger have a combined market
share of at least 5 per cent, or
(b) is market-dominating in one or several markets which in the last
completed calendar year had a turnover of at least DM 100 million, or
2. the enterprises participating in the merger recorded a combined turn-
over of at least DM 10,000 million in the last completed business year
preceding the merger and at least two of the participating enterprises
recorded individual turnovers of at least DM 1,000 million; this pre-
sumption shall not apply, insofar as the merger also satisfies the
conditions of Section 23 (2) No. 2 sentence 3 and the joint venture
does not operate in a market with a turnover of at least DM 500
million in the last calendar year.
(2) For merger control purposes two or three enterprises shall also be
deemed market-dominating, if in one market they obtain the highest mar-
ket shares and a combined market share of 50 per cent, except when the
totality of enterprises have no paramount market position in relation to the
other competitors. Sentence 1 shall not apply, if
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1. that totality comprise [sic] enterprises which recorded turnovers of
less than DM 500 million in the last completed business year, or
2. the merger exclusively affects a market which had a turnover of less
than DM 100 million in the last calendar year, or
3. the enterprises participating in the merger obtain a combined market
share not exceeding 15 per cent.
Section 22 subsections (1) to (3) shall remain unaffected.
(3) Section 23 (1) sentences 2 to 6 and 8 to 10 shall be applied regarding
the calculation of the turnovers and market shares."
5. Section 24 subsections (8) and (9) shall be worded as follows:
"(8) Subsections (1) to (7) shall not apply
1. if the participating enterprises recorded a combined turnover of less
than DM 500 million in the last completed business year, or
2. if an enterprise which is not a controlled enterprise and in the last
completed business year recorded a turnover of less than DM 50
million affiliates itself to another enterprise; except when one enter-
prise recorded a turnover of at least DM 2 million and the other a
turnover of at least DM 1,000 million, or
3. insofar as a market is affected in which goods or commercial services
have been supplied for at least five years and which in the last calen-
dar year had a turnover of less than DM 10 million.
Section 23 (1) sentences 2 to 10 shall be applied regarding the calculation
of the turnovers.
(9) Subsection (8) sentence 1 No. 2 shall not apply insofar as competition
in the publication, production or distribution of newspapers or periodicals
or parts of them is restricted within the meaning of subsection (1) as a
result of the merger."
6. Section 24a shall be amended as follows:
(a) Subsection (1) sentence 2 shall be worded as follows:
"The project shall be notified to the Federal Cartel Office, if
1. one of the enterprises participating in the merger recorded a turnover
of at least DM 2,000 million in the last completed business year, or
2. at least two of the enterprises participating in the merger recorded
individual turnovers of DM 1,000 million or over in the last com-
pleted business year, or
3. the merger is to be effected under the law of a Land by legislation or
any other governmental act."
(b) Subsection (1), sentence 5, shall be worded as follows:
"Section 46 (9) shall apply, as appropriate, to the information and docu-
ments obtained in connection with the notification."
(c) Subsection (4) first half sentence shall be worded as follows:
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"If a merger project has to be notified under subsection (1), sentence 2, it
shall be unlawful either to complete the merger prior to the expiry of the
one-month period specified in subsection (2) sentence 1, and, if the Fed-
eral Cartel Office has given the information referred to in subsection (2)
sentence 1 prior to the expiry of the specified four-month period or the
extension of time agreed upon, or to participate in the completion of the
merger, except when the Federal Cartel Office, prior to the expiry of the
periods mentioned in subsection (2) sentence 1 has given written infor-
mation to the person who has effected the notification that the merger
project does not meet the conditions of prohibition set out in Section 24
(1);"
7. Section 24 b (5) shall be worded as follows:
"(5) The Monopolies Commission shall issue every two years, by June 30,
an opinion covering the situation which prevailed during the last two
completed calendar years and submit it immediately to the Federal Gov-
ernment, the first opinion being due on June 30, 1976. The opinions
pursuant to sentence 1 shall immediately be submitted to the legislative
bodies by the Federal Government and at the same time by published by
the Monopolies Commission. Within a reasonable period the Federal Gov-
ernment shall present its views and comments on the opinions to the
legislative bodies. The Monopolies Commission may give additional opin-
ions as it deems appropriate. The Federal Government may instruct it to
give additional opinions. The Monopolies Commission shall submit opin-
ions pursuant to sentences 4 and 5 to the Federal Government and pub-
lish them. The Federal Minister for Economic Affairs may also request an
opinion from the Monopolies Commission in particular cases which are
submitted to him for decision under Section 24 (3)."
8. Section 26 shall be amended as follows:
(a) In subsection (1) the words "certain enterprises" shall be substituted
for the words "certain competitors".
(b) The following sentence 3 shall be added to subsection (2):
"For the prohibition procedure pursuant to Section 37a (2) a supplier of a
certain type of goods or commercial services shall be presumed to depend
on a purchaser within the meaning of sentence 2, if, in addition to the price
reductions or other considerations customary in the trade, that purchaser
regularly obtains special benefits not granted to similar purchasers".
(c) The following subsection (3) shall be added:
"(3) Market-dominating enterprises and associations of enterprises within
the meaning of subsection (2) sentence 1 shall not use their market
position to cause other enterprises in business activities to accord them
preferential terms in the absence of facts justifying such terms. Sentence
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1 shall also apply to enterprises and associations of enterprises within the
meaning of subsection (2), sentence 2, in relation to the enterprises de-
pending on them."
9. Section 35 shall be amended as follows:
(a) Following subsection (1) the following subsection (2) shall be inserted:
"(2) Any person who wilfully or negligently contravenes any decision
issued by the cartel authority or the appellate court within the meaning of
subsection (1) shall, if the decision or determination pursuant to Section
70 (3) becomes final, compensate for any damage suffered from the date
of service of the decision."
(b) The former subsection (2) shall become subsection (3).
